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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Karl C. Schurr, a light and sound technician in the 
casino industry in New Jersey, appeals from an order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
Resorts International Hotel, Inc., and Bradford Smith, 
Chairman of the New Jersey Casino Control Commission, in 
connection with Schurr's claims of reverse discrimination in 
hiring.1 In his complaint, Schurr alleged that race was the 
determining factor in Resorts' decision not to offer him a 
job which was ultimately filled by an equally well qualified 
minority candidate. Schurr sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Smith, contending that his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. James R. Hurley, the current Chairman of the Commission, has been 
substituted for Smith. 
 
                                2 
  
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the 
Commission's regulations establishing minority 
employment goals. Schurr also alleged that Resorts' 
affirmative action plan as drafted and applied was invalid, 
resulting in violation of his rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. S 1981, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S. 10:5-1 et 
seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Because we are convinced that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on Schurr's Title VII and other statutory claims, 
we will reverse that portion of the District Court's Order 
and remand the matter for further proceedings. As to 
Schurr's Fourteenth Amendment claim against the 
Commission Chairman, we will affirm the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Chairman on standing grounds, 
although for reasons different from those set forth by the 
District Court. 
 
I. 
 
Because this matter, both legally and factually, arises 
against the regulatory background established by the 
Casino Control Commission pursuant to the Casino Control 
Act, N.J.S. 5-12:134, we examine this backgroundfirst. The 
Casino Control Act requires that every casino license holder 
undertake affirmative measures to ensure equal 
employment opportunities. Relevant regulations require 
that casino licensees take affirmative steps "to ensure that 
women, minorities and persons with disabilities are 
recruited and employed at all levels of the operation's work 
force and treated during employment without regard to 
their gender, minority status, or disability." N.J.A.C. 19:53- 
4.3(a). Equal opportunity efforts are to be undertaken in all 
employment practices including promotion, demotion, 
layoffs and termination. Id. Casino licensees are required to 
improve the representation of "[w]omen and minorities in 
job titles within EEOC job categories in which the casino 
licensee is below the applicable employment goals 
established by N.J.A.C. 19-53-4.4." See N.J.A.C. 19:53- 
4.3(b)(2). The regulations establish the following goals: 
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                               Minority Goal           Female Goal 
EEOC Job Category              (Percentage)            (Percentage) 
         
 
Officers and Managers          25                      46 
Professionals                  25                      46 
Technicians                    25                      46 
Sales workers                  25                      46 
Office and Clerical            25                      46 
Crafts persons                 14                       5 
Operatives                     25                      30 
Laborers                       25                      14 
Service Workers                25                      46 
 
N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.4. 
 
In setting these goals, the Commission reviewed 1990 
census data for Atlantic City, New Jersey and for the 
Commission's casino industry work force composition 
analysis. See 25 N.J.R. 3690 (August 15, 1993). The goals 
for each category were "based on the actual number of 
employees in the comparative work force who were actually 
available to fill such positions," and were set so as not to 
exceed the cumulative Atlantic County work force statistics 
in the given category. Id. In addition,"if the Atlantic County 
availability statistic falls significantly (more than ten 
percent) below the cumulative Atlantic County work force 
statistic for that class, the employment goal for that 
particular EEOC category and class will be the Atlantic 
County availability statistic." Id. 
 
In order to meet these goals and as a prerequisite to 
licensing, each casino licensee is required to develop an 
Equal Employment and Business Opportunity Plan 
("EEBOP"). N.J.A.C. 19:53-6.1. The EEBOP must set forth 
a detailed description of "the means by which the[casino] 
intends to comply with the equal opportunity and 
regulatory obligations imposed by N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.4." 
N.J.A.C. 19:53-6.4. While the regulations do not specify the 
means which must be used to meet employment goals, the 
terms of the EEBOP are subject to the approval of the 
Commission. 
 
By statute, the Commission is also charged with 
monitoring the composition of the workforce at each 
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licensed casino. Each licensee is required to file quarterly 
and annual reports with the Commission and the Division 
of Gaming Enforcement on its "affirmative action efforts . . . 
concerning [its] operations work force." N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.5, 
4.6. The quarterly report must include a listing of the 
operations workforce by race and gender in each EEOC job 
category and subclass. Id. Each casino is also required to 
supply a summary of new hires, promotions, terminations, 
and layoffs, a copy of all grievance reports relating to equal 
employment opportunity, and a report on the 
implementation of upward mobility training programs and 
the status of participants. Id. If in a given quarter the 
"casino licensee is below the applicable . . . goal established 
by the N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.4 for a job category in which a 
position with a salary of $35,000 or more is filled by 
someone other than a woman or minority, the casino 
licensee [must] document its efforts to hire or promote a 
woman or minority to the position." N.J.A. 19:53-4.5(c)(2). 
Similarly, "each casino licensee whose annual workforce 
composition report does not demonstrate that the casino 
licensee or applicant achieved the applicable employment 
goals . . . shall be required to document its efforts to 
implement and comply with the operations workforce 
section of its EEBOP. . . ." N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.6. 
 
Casino licensees are also subject to periodic EEBOP 
assessment hearings at which the licensee is required to 
demonstrate its compliance with its equal opportunity and 
affirmative action obligations. If the Commissionfinds that 
the licensee has failed to meet performance goals, the 
licensee must document its good faith efforts to achieve 
these goals, showing that it has implemented and complied 
with those portions of its approved EEBOP which relate to 
achievement of performance goals. N.J.A.C. 19-53-6.8. 
Should the Commission determine that a casino licensee 
has failed to comply with the requirements of the Act, it 
may impose sanctions. Id. These penalties include, among 
others, denial, suspension, revocation of, or refusal to 
renew the casino license, the imposition of license 
conditions, referral of a matter for legal action, assessment 
of civil penalties, and "other action authorized or permitted 
by the Act." N.J.A.C. 19:53-6.11. 
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II. 
 
With the legislative and regulatory background 
established, we turn to the facts. In July 1994 Karl Schurr, 
a white male resident of New Jersey, sought a position as 
a light and sound technician at Resorts in Atlantic City, 
New Jersey. Schurr had worked at Resorts in a number of 
full-time jobs from 1974 until 1986 when he resigned in 
order to enter the restaurant business. After June 1986 
Schurr continued to work for Resorts on occasion as a 
"casual" worker2 on an"as needed" basis. 
 
In late 1993 a full-time light and sound technician at 
Resorts was suspended. While arbitration proceedings 
relevant to this suspension were pending, Schurr, still 
working as a casual employee, filled in for the suspended 
employee on a regular basis. In early July 1994, the labor 
arbitration was concluded and the full-time technician's job 
became available. Five people, including Schurr, applied for 
the job.3 Bill Stevenson, Resorts' Director of Show 
Operations and Stage Manager, narrowed those under 
consideration to Schurr and Ronald Boykin, a black male 
who was also employed as a casual worker at Resorts. Both 
Stevenson and his direct superior, Robert Chambers, 
believed that each of the applicants was qualified for the 
open position. Stevenson viewed the two as equally 
qualified. Acting pursuant to what he believed was required 
by the Resorts EEBOP, Stevenson hired Boykin. Stevenson 
stated that under the EEBOP, the "technician" 
classification was underutilized as of October, 1993, i.e., 
the percentage of minorities in the technician category was 
22.25%, but the goal established by the Casino Control 
Commission regulations was 25%. Stevenson stated that he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A casual employee is defined in the union contract between Resorts 
and the International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees as "an 
employee required to supplement specific classification in the normal 
house crew on an intermittent basis." 
 
3. At about the same time, Schurr also applied to Resorts for a position 
as an apprentice mechanic. Schurr's complaint alleged reverse 
discrimination in Resorts' failure to hire him for this position as well. 
The District Court found that Schurr failed to establish a prima facie 
case with respect to this position. Schurr does not appeal that portion of 
the District Court's ruling. 
 
                                6 
  
believed that in an underutilized category, for which there 
were two equally qualified applicants, he was obligated to 
hire the minority applicant. Chambers, Stevenson's 
superior, also believed that Resorts was obligated to hire 
the minority candidate if one of the two qualified applicants 
for a position was a minority and Resorts had failed to meet 
state goals in the relevant category. 
 
After learning that he had not been hired for the full-time 
technician position, Schurr continued to work as a casual 
employee at Resorts and at other Atlantic City casinos.4 In 
January 1995 Schurr filed a charge of discrimination with 
the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights and the EEOC 
alleging discrimination on the basis of race. He received a 
notice of right to sue on May 7, 1996, and on July 8, 1996, 
Schurr filed this action. 
 
On January 13, 1997 the parties consented to dismissal 
with prejudice of all of Schurr's claims against the 
Commission, and to dismissal of the section 1983 claim for 
monetary damages against the Commission Chairman. 
 
Following the close of discovery, the parties filed motions 
for summary judgment. In an order dated June 30, 1998, 
the District Court entered an order granting the motions 
filed by Resorts and the Commission Chairman and 
denying the motion filed by Schurr. This timely appeal 
followed.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In January 1996, Schurr became a full-time employee of another 
Atlantic City resort. He continues to work at casinos as a casual 
employee for extra income. 
 
5. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of an order 
granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is plenary. Johnson 
v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998). We apply the same test as that 
used by the District Court. We must be satisfied that there is "no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All 
inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Krouse v. 
American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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III. 
 
We address first whether Schurr has standing to assert 
claims against the Commission Chairman for declaratory 
and injunctive relief. Schurr contends that his Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection rights were violated when the 
Commission Chairman enforced the Commission's 
regulations setting minority employment goals and 
requiring that casino licensees implement affirmative action 
plans designed to meet these goals: "Smith and the 
Commission's actions in imposing employment goals in 
Resorts' [EEBOP] and in approving and monitoring same, 
directly resulted in Resorts' denial of the Light and Sound 
Technician . . . position to Schurr." The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission 
Chairman, concluding that Schurr lacked standing to 
pursue his claim. 
 
The standing requirements embodied in the "case" or 
"controversy" provision of Article III of the United States 
Constitution mandate that in every case, the plaintiff be 
able to demonstrate: 
 
        An "injury in fact"-- an invasion of a judicially 
        cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and 
        particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
        conjectural or hypothetical; second, [that] there [is] a 
        causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
        complained of -- the injury has to be "fairly trace[able] 
        to the challenged action of the defendant, and not .. . 
        the result [of] the independent action of some third 
        party not before the court." Third, [that] it [is] "likely," 
        as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will 
        be redressed by a favorable decision." 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(internal citations omitted). Applying these standing 
requirements to the facts of this case, the District Court 
concluded, first, that Schurr did not suffer an "injury in 
fact" within the meaning of Article III. In Northeastern 
Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of 
America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993), 
the Supreme Court determined that "the `injury in fact' in 
an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of 
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equal treatment resulting from the imposition of[a] barrier 
. . . ." Relying on this language, the District Court 
concluded that the challenged regulations constituted 
merely a means of "outreach" to minorities and women, and 
did not constitute a barrier to others: 
 
        The Commission's affirmative action regulations in 
        general, and the minority and women employment 
        goals in particular [did] not erect a barrier to Schurr's 
        ability to compete fairly for the positions for which he 
        applied . . . . [T]he Commission's regulations mandate 
        that casino licensees reach out to women and minority 
        candidates, not that they prefer women and minorities 
        in actually making hiring decisions. Because Schurr 
        applied, and was seriously considered for the light and 
        sound technician job, he was not injured by Resorts' 
        failure to reach out to him . . . . 
 
         [T]he obvious thrust of the regulations is that . . . a 
        casino licensee should broaden the pool of applicants, 
        not that casino licensees should prefer minorities and 
        women to non-minorities and men in making hiring 
        decisions. 
 
         [N]o hiring preference appears on the face of or is 
        implied by the language of the regulations . . . . 
 
Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 537, 548- 
49 (D.N.J. 1998). The District Court reasoned that because 
the regulations merely required casino licensees to 
"broaden the applicant pool by employing various outreach 
efforts," they had not injured Schurr. Id. at 549. 
 
The District Court also concluded that Schurr lacked 
standing to maintain his claim against the Commission 
Chairman because he failed to show a causal link between 
the relevant regulations and Resorts' decision to hire the 
minority candidate. "[T]here is only the most attenuated 
relationship between the Commission's regulations and the 
hiring decisions which allegedly injured or will injure 
Schurr." Id. at 550. In the District Court's view, the 
regulations at issue did not mandate a particular 
employment decision: 
 
        [W]ith respect to the decision not to hire Schurr for the 
        light and sound technician job, Schurr's damage is 
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        fairly traceable only to Resorts' actions in implementing 
        its affirmative action plan and Resorts' actions in 
        administering the plan through its employees.... 
        Schurr's damage is not, however, traceable as far back 
        as the Commission's regulations. 
 
Id. The Court concluded that: 
 
        The "links in the chain" between the Commission's 
        regulations and Schurr's alleged injury are "far too 
        weak as a whole to sustain" Schurr's standing. 
        Accordingly, I will grant Smith's Motion for Summary 
        Judgment and deny Schurr's Motion for Summary 
        Judgment on his section 1983 claim. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted.) 
 
The District Court's standing analysis as to both injury in 
fact and causation rested on its characterization of the 
Commission's regulations: "[These] regulations specifically 
do not authorize or encourage the use of preference in 
hiring. Instead they specifically provide for other, much 
more benign methods by which casino licensees may 
expand the applicant pool." Id. at 549-50. According to the 
District Court, "even the most casual review of the 
Commission's regulations" reveals that "the obvious thrust 
of the regulations is that, in order to improve the 
representation of women and minorities . . . a casino 
licensee should broaden the pool of applicants . . .." Id. at 
549. 
 
We disagree with the District Court's characterization of 
the regulations. Our reading of both the Act and the 
implementing regulations convinces us that the regulatory 
scheme challenged here contemplates something beyond 
"benign methods by which casino licensees may expand the 
applicant pool." Id. at 550. The finding that the challenged 
regulations are directed only at recruitment is inconsistent 
with the language used in the regulations. 
 
The regulations were drafted to prohibit discrimination by 
"encouraging businesses to achieve a balanced 
representation of employees at all levels of the work force," 
N.J.A.C. 15:32-1.1, and to ensure that "affirmative efforts 
are made to recruit and employ" minorities, N.J.A.C. 19:53- 
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1.4 (emphasis added). Affirmative efforts are to address, 
without limitation, all employment practices including: 
 
        (1) employment promotion, demotion or transfer; 
 
        (2) recruitment, recruitment advertising or postin g; 
 
        (3) layoff or termination; 
 
        (4) rates of pay and other forms of compensation o r 
        benefits; 
 
        (5) selection for training and upward mobility 
        programs; and; 
 
        (6) grievance procedures for, and disposition of, 
        complaints related to equal employment opportunity. 
        . . . 
 
N.J.A.C. 19.53-4.3. If a casino licensee fails to meet the 
established goal, the licensee is required to document its 
good faith efforts to hire a qualified female or minority 
candidate for the position. N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.3. 
 
The broad language used throughout the regulations as 
a whole undermines both the District Court's conclusion 
that the scheme is addressed to recruitment alone and its 
disposition of the standing issue on the basis of that 
conclusion. We agree with the District Court that the 
regulations do not mandate specific hiring decisions. We 
are convinced, however, that in setting employment goals 
for women and minorities, in monitoring compliance with 
these goals, and in providing for sanctions if casino 
licensees cannot demonstrate good faith efforts to comply 
with those goals, the regulations were intended to influence 
employment decisions generally and may, as here, affect 
concrete decisions; for example, which of two equally 
qualified job candidates will be hired. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the 
Resort employees responsible for hiring under the EEBOP. 
They testified that they believed that the regulations and 
the EEBOP formulated and reviewed pursuant to those 
regulations required that they hire the minority candidate 
over Schurr. Given the candidates' comparable 
qualifications, those responsible for hiring at Resorts were 
unable to justify hiring Schurr where the technician job 
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category was underutilized. Furthermore, they did not want 
to bear the administrative burden of having to do so. This 
evidence supports the conclusion that the regulations set 
employment goals, and place administrative pressure upon 
casino licensees to meet these goals. The fact that the 
regulations do not explicitly require minority hiring or 
mandate a race-based decision is not dispositive of the 
causation question. 
 
Although it was decided under a somewhat different set 
of facts, our causation analysis is guided by the discussion 
set forth by our sister Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Bras v. California Public Utilities, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996). In Bras, the 
court considered an equal protection challenge to a 
California statute, the California Women and Minority 
Business Enterprise Law, which required nongovernmental 
contractors to meet minority participation goals. Pursuant 
to this law, the California Public Utilities Commission was 
directed to formulate goals for state utilities in the 
procurement of goods and services from minority-owned 
businesses. In 1988, the Commission promulgated an order 
requiring each state utility to establish a "goal" specifying 
that it would purchase at least fifteen percent of its utilities 
requirements from minority firms. 
 
In response to this Order, in 1991, Pacific Bell provided 
a prequalification form to a number of architectural firms 
from which it expected to receive proposals for future work. 
This form required the firms to specify whether they were 
certified as a minority or women enterprise. Bras submitted 
its form, stating that it was not so certified. Because it was 
not a minority enterprise, Bras was not selected as one of 
the firms eligible to bid on Pacific Bell projects. 
 
Bras filed suit in federal court alleging that the Law and 
the Order violated the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Bras also sought a permanent injunction 
preventing the Commission from implementing the goals 
provided for in the Law and the Order. The district court 
dismissed Bras' claim for lack of standing. 
 
On appeal, a majority of the Court held that Bras had 
satisfied the standing requirements and should have been 
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permitted to pursue the request for injunctive relief.6 The 
Court found that although the challenged Law and Order 
set "goals" and not set-asides, they had the practical effect 
of placing the Bras firm on unequal footing in competing for 
business. According to the Court of Appeals, the"economic 
reality" created by both the Law and the Order was the 
requirement that California utilities adopt discriminatory 
programs, or risk sanction. As a result, the Court held that 
there was a connection between Bras' injury and 
implementation of the Law and Order sufficient to satisfy 
the causation element of the standing analysis. 
 
We do not find any meaningful distinction between the 
goals at issue in Bras and those challenged here. The 
challenged goal-based regulations, like those at issue in 
Bras, clearly have the practical effect of encouraging (if not 
outright compelling) discriminatory hiring. 
 
That employment goals may, in some circumstances, 
create a classification based on race was also recognized by 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. 
Cir.), reh'g denied, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir.), and reh'g en 
banc denied, 154 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1998). There the 
Court addressed the impact of the FCC's regulatory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Bras court determined that the question of standing was 
controlled by the Supreme Court's holding in Northeastern Florida 
Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 666 (1993), and that the "injury in fact" associated with 
minority preference programs is "the inability to compete on an equal 
footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract." Bras, 59 F.3d 
at 873. The court concluded that Bras satisfied this "injury in fact" 
requirement by stating that he wanted to "reinstate" his eligibility to 
bid 
on Pacific Bell projects "in the future" and that he was "ready, willing 
and able" to provide services to Pacific Bell. Id. at 873-74. Tracking 
this 
language, Schurr here asserts that he is "ready, willing and able" to work 
at Resorts. As discussed infra, this allegation does not itself resolve 
the 
issue of whether Schurr has established a sufficiently imminent injury to 
be entitled to forward-looking relief. That issue is governed by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995), a decision that 
issued shortly after and was therefore not addressed in Bras. Moreover, 
unlike the situation in Bras, the evidence in this case indicates that 
Schurr has in fact been repeatedly subject to the challenged regulations, 
without apparent adverse consequence. 
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requirement that radio stations adopt affirmative action 
programs incorporating numerical goals, based on 
population data, for hiring women and minorities. In 
determining that goals similar to those at issue here 
created minority preferences subject to equal protection 
analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that the crucial point 
is not whether the regulations required quotas, but rather 
whether they obliged stations to grant some degree of 
preference to minorities in hiring. Concluding that the 
challenged regulations granted such a preference, the court 
explained: 
 
        The entire scheme is built on the notion that stations 
        should aspire to a workforce that attains, or at least 
        approaches, proportional representation. . . . The very 
        term "under-representation" necessarily implies that if 
        such a situation exists, the station is falling short of 
        the desired outcome. The regulations pressure stations 
        to maintain a workforce that mirrors the racial 
        breakdown of their "metropolitan statistical area." 
 
        . . . 
 
        Although it was urged that . . . "goals" should be 
        treated differently than obligatory set asides . . . we do 
        not think it matters whether a government hiring 
        program imposes hard quotas, soft quotas, or goals. 
        Any one of these techniques induces an employer to 
        hire with an eye toward meeting the numerical target. 
        As such, they can and surely will result in individuals 
        being granted a privilege because of their race. 
 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 351-52, 
354. 
 
However, our conclusion that the District Court erred 
both in characterizing the regulations at issue and in 
holding that Schurr failed to establish causation does not 
mandate reversal, for there is another component of the 
standing inquiry that is at issue. 
 
Schurr's sole equal protection claim against the 
Commission Chairman is for forward-looking declaratory 
and injunctive relief. In order to have standing to challenge 
future rather than past application of the regulation, 
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Schurr must allege that the setting of minority employment 
goals for job categories within the casino industry "in the 
future constitutes `an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' " Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560). 
Under this standard, Schurr must demonstrate that he will 
in the future be prevented from competing on an equal 
basis with minority candidates; i.e., Schurr must show that 
the employment goals embodied in the challenged 
regulations will cause "imminent" injury. The District Court 
held that Schurr failed to do so. Schurr, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 
551. We agree. 
 
Schurr's evidence in support of his claim that he is in 
danger of imminent injury in fact supports the opposite 
conclusion. For example, Schurr testified at his deposition 
that since January 1996, he has held a full-time position as 
an engineer at another casino. The engineering position 
appears to be one covered by the challenged regulations 
(under either the "professional" or "technician" category). 
Schurr also testified that in addition to this full-time work, 
he has obtained part-time casino work -- at Resorts as well 
as at least five other casinos -- "filling in" for extra money. 
The part-time work appears to be that of a technician. This 
evidence indicates that since being denied the full-time 
technician's job in 1994, Schurr repeatedly has been 
subjected to the regulations, with no apparent adverse 
effect. 
 
In evaluating Schurr's evidence of imminent harm, we are 
also mindful of what is not in the record. There is no 
evidence of how frequently jobs for which Schurr is 
qualified become available.7 There is no evidence of how 
frequently Schurr must compete with women or minorities 
for those jobs. There is no evidence as of whether Schurr 
has been denied any other job for which he applied-- or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Such evidence is of obvious important to the imminence issue. For 
example, Schurr testified at this deposition that he rarely works at "the 
Sands" merely because "they don't do much." The challenged regulations 
thus played no part in Schurr's inability to work at the Sands. 
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the reason for such denial. Nor is there any evidence of 
whether any of the other casinos at which Schurr might 
apply have met their relevant goals, or whether they, like 
Resorts, consider the "goals" to mandate hiring preferences. 
This record is therefore distinguishable from that in 
Adarand, which supported a finding that Adarand had 
established a threat of "imminent injury" necessary to 
maintain its claim for forward-looking relief. The evidence 
in Adarand included statistical evidence of how frequently 
the relevant contracts came up for bid; evidence that 
Adarand bid on every such contract in Colorado, and was 
"very likely" to bid on future contracts; and evidence that 
Adarand "often" had to compete against businesses certified 
under the challenged program. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212. 
We also note the statement in Lujan that " `some day' 
intentions" are insufficient to establish an imminent injury. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). 
 
In sum, Schurr failed to make an adequate showing that 
he is in danger of suffering imminent injury as a result of 
the challenged regulations. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Commission Chairman, limited in accordance 
with our foregoing discussion. 
 
IV. 
 
We focus next on Schurr's claim that Resorts violated the 
requirements of Title VII when it made race a factor in the 
decision not to hire Schurr. 
 
Because the District Court, after extensive analysis, 
rejected Schurr's equal protection claim for lack of standing,8 
it conducted only a cursory Title VII analysis.9 Generally, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our decision with respect to Schurr's standing to pursue forward- 
looking relief on his equal protection claim applies as well to any claim 
for forward-looking relief under Title VII or the related statutes that 
Schurr asserts. 
 
9. For example, the District Court concluded the Commission's 
affirmative action regulations were enacted to remedy a manifest 
imbalance because it found the regulations set forth "employment goals 
on a category by category basis" and "distinguishe[d] between skilled and 
unskilled workers." But under Weber, a court determines whether a 
manifest imbalance existed by examining the racial makeup of the labor 
force. 
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courts of appeals should not decide the legality of an 
affirmative action program in the absence of careful district 
court analysis of the merits. In most cases, a district 
court's analysis of why an affirmative action plan was 
adopted and how the plan affects non-minorities is crucial 
to thorough and effective appellate review of the plan. See 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 
(1986) (plurality opinion) (stating that in the absence of 
district court's analysis an "appellate court reviewing a 
challenge by nonminority employees to remedial action 
cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified 
as a remedy for prior discrimination"); In re Birmingham 
Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 
1539-40 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that district court 
findings of fact are "necessary" to appellate review and that 
in their absence "appellate court has no basis upon which 
to determine whether race-based action was justified as a 
remedy"); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 
1989) (refusing to decide legality of affirmative action 
program because, inter alia, district court did not make 
findings of fact regarding past discrimination). In most 
cases, therefore, the better course is to remand and 
instruct the district court to conduct this analysis. But this 
is an atypical case; here, the record on summary judgment 
makes clear that Resorts' plan was not adopted to remedy 
a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job 
categories. Accordingly, based on that record, we will 
assess whether Resorts' plan violates Title VII. 
 
The terms of Title VII are violated when an employer 
takes action "to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment" or "to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise affect his status as an employee" on the basis of 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e - 2(a). Although this language was initially 
construed as absolute -- prohibiting all discrimination in 
employment, see e.g. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 643 (1987)-- it is clear 
now that in certain circumstances, race-based employment 
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decisions made pursuant to an affirmative action plan do 
not run afoul of the statute. 
 
We considered affirmative action efforts in the context of 
a Title VII action in Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 
1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 118 S.Ct. 595 (1997). 
There, we cited the Supreme Court's decision in United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), that: 
"Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination is not 
violated by affirmative action plans which, first, `have 
purposes that mirror those of the statute' and second, `do 
not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the [non- 
minority] employees.' " 91 F.3d at 1550. 10 
 
In order to determine the purpose underlying Title VII, we 
analyzed Supreme Court precedent in light of the plain 
language of Title VII, and concluded that: 
 
        Title VII was enacted to further two primary goals: to 
        end discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
        sex or national origin, thereby guaranteeing equal 
        opportunity in the workplace, and to remedy the 
        segregation and under-representation of minorities that 
        discrimination has caused in our nation's workforce. 
 
Id. at 1556. We placed particular emphasis on the remedial 
component of Title VII, finding it central to the Title VII 
scheme: 
 
        The significance of [the] second corrective purpose 
        cannot be overstated. It is only because Title VII was 
        written to eradicate not only discrimination per se but 
        the consequences of prior discrimination as well, that 
        racial preferences in the form of affirmative action can 
        co-exist with the Act's antidiscrimination mandate. 
 
Id. We then announced the following rule which now guides 
our discussion of Schurr's Title VII claim and Resorts' 
affirmative action plan: "Unless an affirmative action plan 
has a remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror the 
purposes of the statute, and, therefore, cannot satisfy the 
first prong of the Weber test." Id.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. This two-prong test announced in Weber was reaffirmed in Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
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The parties in this matter agree that Schurr has 
established a prima facie case of race-based employment 
discrimination11 and that Resorts rested its decision not to 
hire Schurr on the terms of its affirmative action policy. 
Here, then, as was the case in Taxman, "The dispositive 
liability issue ... is the validity of [Resorts'] policy under 
Title VII." Id. 
 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this matter and 
are convinced that the affirmative action plan offered to 
rebut Schurr's prima facie case lacks the remedial purpose 
required by controlling precedent. In order to be 
characterized accurately as remedial, an affirmative action 
plan must be designed to correct a "manifest imbalance in 
traditionally segregated job categories." Weber, 443 U.S. at 
207. "The requirement that `manifest imbalance' relate to a 
traditionally segregated job category `provides assurance 
. . . that race will be taken into account in a manner 
consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects 
of employment discrimination . . ." Johnson, 480 U.S. 650 
(emphasis added). 
 
Under our reasonable interpretation of this standard, 
Resorts' affirmative action plan is deficient. The plan itself 
and the regulations which mandate the plan were not 
based on any finding of historical or then-current 
discrimination in the casino industry or in the technician 
job category; the plan was not put in place as a result of 
any manifest imbalance or in response to a finding that any 
relevant job category was or ever had been affected by 
segregation.12 Indeed, the case now before us is an unusual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We analyze Schurr's Title VII claim under the approach set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). When a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the 
employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. 
The decision in Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626, establishes that one such 
reason may be an affirmative action plan. If the employer is able to meet 
this burden of production, the burden shifts back to the employee to 
demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason offered is pretextual, i.e. 
that the affirmative action plan is invalid. 
 
12. Evidence that a manifest imbalance existed either before or after 
Resorts enacted its plan would have sufficed. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
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one in that there is no disagreement as to whether Resorts' 
plan or the challenged regulations were intended to remedy 
past or present discrimination. They were not. In a 
deposition, Gustave Thomas, the designated Commission 
representative, testified as follows: 
 
           Q: Now prior to issuing the employment goals 
              in the Commission's regs, did the 
              Commission itself ever practice 
              discrimination? 
 
        Thomas: No, not to my knowledge. 
 
           Q: Was there ever any finding that the state 
              had discriminated with regard to the various 
              job categories and the employment goals 
              pursuant to those categories issued by the 
              Commission regs? 
 
           A: Not to my knowledge. 
 
           Q: The casinos, from the inception of the casino 
              industry in Atlantic City, have always needed 
              to have the employment goals pursuant to 
              those categories issued by the Commission 
              rep? 
 
           A: That's correct. 
 
The remainder of the record contains nothing to suggest 
that the Act or the regulations promulgated pursuant to 
that Act were drafted or enacted with an intent to remedy 
any discrimination. The Commission does not contend 
otherwise. On appeal, the Commission makes the following 
statement relevant to the purpose underlying the Act and 
the regulations: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Penna., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 
990, 1004 (3d Cir. 1993) (admitting post-enactment evidence); see also 
Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that refusing to admit post-enactment evidence places 
municipalities in the "dilemma of deciding whether to wait the months 
necessary for further development of the record, risking . . . culpability 
[to Blacks] due to inaction, or to act and risk liability [to Whites] for 
acting prematurely but otherwise justifiably.") 
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        The Legislature recognized that a once renowned 
        tourist area had become blighted and had been largely 
        abandoned by tourists. The Legislature was also aware 
        Atlantic City had and has a large minority population, 
        and sought to ensure that the job creation which 
        would accompany casino developments would benefit 
        all segments of the population. 
 
This absence of any reference to or showing of past or 
present discrimination in the casino industry is fatal. The 
affirmative action plan relied on by Resorts in this Title VII 
action is invalid under the first prong of Weber13 and 
"cannot form the basis for deviating from the 
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII." Taxman, 91 F.3d 
at 1563. Schurr, therefore, is entitled to summary 
judgment on the Title VII claim. 
 
V. 
 
Our disposition of Schurr's Title VII claim dictates 
reversal of the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Resorts on Schurr's claims based on the NJLAD 
and on section 1981. 
 
Analysis of a claim made pursuant to the NJLAD 
generally follows analysis of a Title VII claim. We predicted 
in Taxman that the New Jersey Supreme Court considering 
an affirmative action plan in light of the NJLAD "would 
follow the analytical directive of Weber and Johnson." 91 
F.3d at 1564. The result under the NJLAD would, therefore, 
be the same as that reached in our Title VII analysis. 
Schurr is entitled to summary judgment on his claim made 
under the NJLAD. 
 
The result is similar with respect to Schurr's claim based 
on 42 U.S.C. S 1981. While a valid affirmative action plan 
serves as a defense to an action under section 1981, the 
standard for evaluating the validity of a plan is identical to 
the standard developed in Title VII cases. Setser v. Novack 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Because we conclude that Resorts' plan fails the first part of the 
Weber test, we do not address whether the plan passes the second part 
of that test; i.e., whether it "unnecessarily trammel[s] the interests of 
[non-minority] employees." Weber, 443 U.S. at 207-08. 
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Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir. 1981). In light 
of our conclusion that the Resorts' affirmative action plan 
was invalid for purposes of Title VII, we also conclude that 
the plan cannot serve as a defense to Schurr's section 1981 
claim. The grant of summary judgment in favor of Resorts 
on this claim was, therefore, inappropriate. As the District 
Court recognized, "In the Third Circuit, the elements of 
employment discrimination under Title VII are identical to 
the elements of a section 1981 claim." Schurr, 16 F. 
Supp.2d at 556. Schurr was entitled to summary judgment 
under Title VII and should have been granted summary 
judgment on the section 1981 claim as well. 
 
Because the District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants on the Title VII and related 
statutory claims, it did not, of course, consider the question 
of damages. Based on our holding in this matter, an 
assessment of damages is required. As the record is 
understandably devoid of evidence bearing on this 
assessment, we will remand this matter to the District 
Court for further proceedings. 
 
VI. 
 
We find that the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Commission Chairman 
on Schurr's equal protection claim and will, therefore, 
affirm the Order of the District Court with respect to that 
claim. We find that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Resorts on claims made 
pursuant to Title VII, Section 1981, and the NJLAD, and 
will direct that summary judgment be entered in favor of 
Schurr on these claims. This matter will be remanded to 
the District Court for consideration of damages under Title 
VII and the related statutes. 
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